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Abstract  
The public transport network of a region inhabited by more than 4 million people is run by a 
complex interplay of public and private actors. Large amounts of data are generated by 
travellers, buying and using various forms of tickets and passes. Analysing the data is of 
paramount importance for the governance and sustainability of the system. This manuscript 
reports the early results of the privacy analysis which is being undertaken as part of the analysis 
of the clearing process in the Emilia-Romagna region, in Italy, which will compute the 
compensations for tickets bought from one operator and used with another. In the manuscript it 
is shown by means of examples that the clearing data may be used to violate various privacy 
aspects regarding users, as well as (technically equivalent) trade secrets regarding operators. 
The ensuing discussion has a twofold goal. First, it shows that after researching possible 
existing solutions, both by reviewing the literature on general privacy-preserving techniques, 
and by analysing similar scenarios that are being discussed in various cities across the world, 
the former are found exhibiting structural effectiveness deficiencies, while the latter are found of 
limited applicability, typically involving less demanding requirements. Second, it traces a 
research path towards a more effective approach to privacy-preserving data management in the 
specific context of public transport, both by refinement of current sanitization techniques and by 
application of the privacy by design approach. 
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Introduction 
The current trend in management of public 
transport systems is to outsource services 
to multiple private operators, requiring them 
to integrate their ticketing and fare system 
with one another. When this concept is 
introduced in regions that used to have 
single local entities managing every aspect 
of ticketing, or that conversely left operators 
free to adopt incompatible, separate 
ticketing systems, a new layer of 
coordination must be put in place. 
There are many examples of this kind of 
approach around the world, such as the 
Oyster card system in London, the Octopus 
card system in Hong Kong, or the 
Istanbulkart in Istanbul just to name a few. 
As a case study, this paper considers the 
Emilia-Romagna region of Italy, where the 
Regional Government has been running for 
several years a project to integrate the 
control processes of the various transport 
companies operating in the region. These 
companies typically operate over disjoint 
territories, and they used to manage 
independent and localized ticketing systems. 
The trend with the new regional system is to 
go more and more towards integration of 
tariffs, routes and ticketing, so that the 
citizen may buy a ticket in city by a given 
operator and use it in another city with 
another operator. While providing an 
improved service to citizen this approach 
also brings some additional burden, since a 
clearing system is needed to share the 
revenue of tickets sales according to the 
actual service each operator has provided 
(and thus, supposedly, to the real costs it 
has incurred). 
Data detailing every trip, collected by public 
transport operators, previously confined to 
internal use only, now must be shared and 
can potentially harm passengers. The 
system that manages it does not merely 
need to control data disclosure, but has to 
be designed to manage potential risks 
during the collection and processing of data. 
This is a challenging task, which must 
manage privacy risks appropriately on the 
one hand, and preserve data utility to a level 
that guarantee usefulness for clearing 
purposes on the other hand. This paper 
illustrates the work the authors are doing to 
design and test the clearing system in a way 
that safeguards the protection of personal 
information, not as a result of some policy 
superimposed to the existing functions, but 
rather taking into account this requisite from 
the start, by applying the principles of 
Privacy by Design.  
The manuscript is organized as follows. In 
Section 2 the local context and the general 
ideas behind the clearing system are briefly 
presented and reviewed, and research 
questions are stated. Section 3 gives an 
overview of the general principles of data 
sanitization for the purpose of safe release 
of sensitive information. Section 4 illustrates 
the risks connected with the release of 
sensitive information, focusing on the 
desanitization attacks that exploit public 
data sources, and Section 5 gives two 
examples of how these attacks can affect 
the clearing datasets. Section 6 describes 
the general principles of Privacy by Design, 
and outlines the direction of current and 
future work to apply them to the scenario of 
the clearing system, before conclusions are 
draft in Section 7. 
 
The Clearing System Scenario 
The Local Context 
The Emilia-Romagna Region has 
approximately a population of 4.5 Million 
with an area of 22500 square Kilometres. 
About half of the population leaves in the 13 
main cities that are lined along the ancient 
Roman road called “Via Emilia”1 which gives 
its name to the Region. Emilia-Romagna is 
highly industrialized with a number of 
                                                          
1  The Via Aemilia, named after the Roman 
consul Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, was completed 
in 187 BC and runs from Piacenza, in the central 
part of the largest plain (Pianura Padana) in 
northern Italy, to Rimini on the Adriatic sea 
shore in an almost straight line for about 250 km. 
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companies typically spread along the Via 
Emilia around the main urban centres. For 
this reason the mobility infrastructures are a 
key part of the logistics supporting the 
economy of the region. 
The estimate of daily trips made by Emilia-
Romagna citizens for work or leisure is 
about 9 Millions of which 25% walk or bike 
and 8% by public transport means. The 
public transportation system is built around 
a rail backbone basically parallel to the Via 
Emilia which links the main urban centres. 
Local transportation systems in the cities 
mostly use buses. The local systems are 
run by four large operators and a few small 
operators on specific routes. 
The policy maker is the regional Mobility 
and Transport Councillorship which is 
competent, among many subjects, for the 
planning of the infrastructural network, 
regional and local mobility systems. Over 
the last decade the Councillorship pursued 
service integration and multi-modality of 
public mobility systems, promoting, in 
particular, the deployment of regional 
integrated fares with an investment of about 
20 M€ in supporting hardware (central 
control systems, ticketing machines, vehicle 
monitoring systems etc.). 
The issue of the MiMuovo (I move) chip 
card was the flagship project of the fare 
integration process, supporting multi-modal 
tickets valid over a given path spanning 
several operators and transport means. For 
instance a user holding a MiMuovo card 
with an integrated travel contract is allowed 
to use the bus (run by operator A) in his 
home town to reach the railway station, the 
train (run by operator B) to his/her working 
town and the bus (run by operator C) to 
his/her working place. To date about 
300,000 MiMuovo cards have been 
deployed and are used daily.  
Today the Councillorship is also fostering 
fare integration for single trip tickets that can 
be bought in any town and used in any 
other within the Region. This requires the 
operator selling the ticket to share the 
revenue with other operators, if they are 
involved in its use. This is called clearing 
process, and has to be implemented in a 
way accepted fairly by the whole set of 
operators involved, to guarantee the 
integrated system sustainability. 
The Clearing System 
The clearing system is based on a 
distributed architecture in which each 
operator is responsible for the management 
and maintenance of its own data. The data 
needed for the computation of the clearing 
function is collected in a clearing database 
located in a central processing centre, 
operated by a regional in-house company, 
in order to guarantee neutrality and to avoid 
disturbing the production systems of the 
operators. 
The creation of the clearing database 
requires the sharing of the operators 
dataset in a standard, machine readable 
format, thus creating a possible threat as a 
consequence of secondary uses. Moreover 
the regional Councillorship aims at using the 
data for in-depth analysis of the transport 
system performance. Eventually, part of the 
datasets could be released to the public as 
open data.  
Operators and public bodies do not have 
any effective control over future uses of 
their dataset once it is publicly available. 
Unfortunately the data about sales and 
usage may reveal issues the operators 
consider part of their industrial secrets 
and/or sensitive information in terms of 
personal privacy. 
This problem can be (partly) mitigated by 
applying full anonymization safeguards, 
which is very difficult when the utility of the 
database is to be maintained. Moreover, it is 
possible to adequately inform the involved 
subjects of the intention to disseminate the 
dataset in an open data format, alerting 
them to potential risks, but this action can 
limit the degree of user acceptance, 
especially if the policy intentionally leaves 
open what kind of secondary uses of their 
data will be done. Therefore a trivial solution 
to the issue does not exist.  
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Research Questions 
From the point of view of the users, in the 
widest sense that encompasses passengers, 
operators, and regulators, the most pressing 
questions to be answered are: with the 
current data storage and utilization 
processes, is it possible to breach data 
privacy and re-identify the data subjects? 
Which kind of processing and links to 
people and business-related issues are 
possible, for example by matching the 
clearing database data with other external 
databases? From the point of view of the 
researchers, these questions can be 
answered by analysing the underlying 
scientific and technical tools: what features 
do the current data sanitization algorithms 
exhibit? Is it possible to measure their 
effectiveness in any given scenario? 
Symmetrically, can the experience gathered 
from similar projects in other cities/regions 
point our research in the right direction, or 
are our requisites too specific? 
Once the background analysis is complete, 
if it highlights deficiencies either in the basic 
technologies or in their application to 
specific scenarios, the research activity will 
be directed towards the definition of a more 
effective framework for public transport data 
sanitization. 
 
Sanitization: A Critical Overview 
The architecture outlined in Section 2.2 
introduces two possible security attack 
vectors. The first one is the intrusion of an 
unauthorized party, in which data are 
subtracted from the primary database; this 
is a classical issue of information security 
and access control, and this work does not 
deal with its direct form; yet, it takes into 
account the similar situation of purposely 
releasing data for public use, considering 
that it could be enriched though correlation 
with external data sources, to the extent of 
disclosing details that should not be made 
public. The second one is called an insider 
attack, also referred to as an insider threat; 
this type of attack arises due to a malicious 
threat from somehow authorized actors, 
from inside the organizations that are 
legitimately involved in data collection and 
processing; the next chapter illustrates ways 
to perform this kind of attacks and 
corresponding effects.  
A data sanitization phase is commonly 
proposed in the literature as the necessary 
step to prevent these issues; this phase as 
defined by Crawford et al. (2007), is "the 
process of altering [a dataset] so that it 
remains usable for beneficial purposes, 
while minimizing its use for harmful 
purposes". To properly define this process, 
the key issue to deal with is to understand 
what "keeping the beneficial purposes" and 
"minimizing the harmful purposes" mean. 
Ideally, the process should be able to 
manipulate the data in a way that prevents 
privacy attacks but at the same time 
preserves the possibility of performing many 
kinds of economic computations. To 
progress towards this goal, the existing 
literature is analysed to find (a) whether 
convincing measures of utility and 
vulnerability of the dataset exist and (b) 
whether existing algorithms result in positive 
trade-offs when applied to our context. 
The literature was analysed as follows. 
Starting from the basic requisite of having to 
anonymize the data, the generally-
applicable techniques of data 
anonymization were reviewed, highlighting 
their limitations. 
Next, the application of these techniques to 
the clearing scenario was attempted, taking 
into account the literature on the evaluation 
of these techniques, namely verifying the 
impact of their known limitations, and 
introducing metrics that allow to determine 
whether a satisfying level of privacy is 
attained.  
Subsequently, the symmetrical path was 
followed, starting from similar cases for 
which documentation of the process of 
transport data privacy protection exists, 
such as those of Montreal and Amsterdam. 
However, the analysis of the various 
aspects highlighted that, even though there 
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are important points of contact, these 
experiences did not need to take into 
account some requirements that turn out to 
be of critical importance for the clearing 
scenario. As a consequence, the techniques 
devised for those systems would leave ours 
subject to numerous types of attack, both of 
kinds already known in the literature, and of 
other kinds described in this paper as proofs 
of concept. 
For each section reviewing a specific 
subject, a table is provided at the end, 
summarizing the most relevant literature 
sources, their contribution, and the open 
issues (both in terms of intrinsic limitations 
of the methods and of gap between the 
methods and the requirements of the 
specific scenario of this paper). 
General-Purpose Sanitization 
Approaches in the Literature 
As a preliminary consideration, to 
understand the way algorithms manipulate 
datasets to achieve the aforementioned 
results, it is useful to note that every 
approach is based on the classification of 
data elements according to the potentially 
sensitive information in three categories 
(Ranjit and Acharya, 2008; Zevenbergen et 
al., 2013): 
Identifier attributes (or identifiers) 
can individually distinguish the data subject 
more or less directly. Typical identifiers 
include: name, address, social security 
numbers, mobile phone number, IMEI 
number. 
Quasi identifier (or key) attributes 
can be used to identify a data subject using 
auxiliary sources of information, by linking to 
databases that contain identifying 
information. They are indirect identifiers of a 
data subject, which make an individual more 
distinctive in a population. Typical key 
attributes include: age, race, gender, date of 
birth, and place of residence. 
Sensitive (or secondary) attributes 
cannot individually identify a data subject 
directly and may require significant amounts 
of auxiliary data to be useful for re-
identification purposes. A data subject may 
then be identified individually through more 
sophisticated methods such as 
fingerprinting, rather than mere linking of 
databases. Examples include settings in an 
application, battery level measured over 
time, or location patterns. 
In summary, the literature describes four 
main techniques of data anonymization. 
k-anonymity (Sweeney, 2002; Ciriani 
et al., 2007) is the most well-known 
technique for generalization. The basic 
principle here is to replace exact values with 
ranges, wide enough to guarantee that 
every attribute in a database appears with 
identical values in a given number of other 
rows, forming a group of k rows 
indistinguishable from each other. This 
approach may take the form, for example, of 
grouping subjects’ locations into sufficiently 
large areas such that no set of locations is 
unique to any individual. The enforcement 
of k-anonymity requires the preliminary 
identification of the quasi-identifier. The 
quasi-identifier, as previously defined, 
depends on the external information 
available to the recipient, as this determines 
her ability to make correlations (not all 
possible external data sources are available 
to every possible data recipient); different 
quasi-identifiers can potentially exist for a 
given table. Many variations and 
improvements exist, yet k-anonymity 
techniques cannot hide whether an 
individual is in the dataset, and it performs 
poorly in protecting sensitive attributes 
against attacks based on background 
knowledge or on the knowledge of the 
details of its application. (L. Sweeney, 2002)  
l-diversity (Machanavajjhala et al., 
2006) is an improvement of k-anonymity 
that require the sensitive attribute 
associated with each quasi-identifier to 
appear at least with l different values. Other 
refinements have been proposed, but as 
described also in Pingshui et al. (2013) 
processing a large dataset to achieve l-
diversity is time-consuming and vulnerable 
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to inference attacks in presence of a series 
of updated publications of the same dataset, 
if it is simply re-anonymized with the same 
approach every time. Finally the added 
requirements proved to be neither 
necessary nor sufficient to prevent sensitive 
attribute disclosure (Li et al., 2007).  
An example of the effects of the application 
of k-anonymity and l-diversity techniques on 
the dataset that is the object of our study is 
shown in Figure 1. 
t-closeness (Machanavajjhala, 2007) 
To improve robustness of k-anonymity, the 
same authors of l-diversity also proposed a 
privacy notion called t-closeness, which 
requires that the distribution of a sensitive 
attribute in any equivalence class is close to 
the distribution of the attribute in the overall 
table (i.e., the distance between the two 
distributions should not be greater than a 
threshold t). In other words, an equivalence 
class is said to have t-closeness if the 
distance between the distribution of a 
sensitive attribute in this class and the 
distribution of the attribute in the whole table 
is no more than a threshold t. A table is said 
to have t-closeness if all equivalence 
classes have t-closeness. 
Differential Privacy is a process 
derived from cryptography. As defined in 
Roth (2014), it “aims to provide means to 
maximize the accuracy of queries from 
statistical databases while minimizing the 
chances of identifying its records.” Unlike 
other methods, differential privacy operates 
off a solid mathematical foundation, making 
it possible to provide strong theoretical 
guarantees on the privacy and utility of 
released data. The most used technique is 
called ε-differential privacy and it is 
modelled via a randomized algorithm; a 
theoretical definition is given in (Neustar, 
2014) and summarized as follows. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Effects of anonymization techniques on the transport dataset 
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“A randomized function K gives ε-differential 
privacy if for all data sets D and D′ differing 
on at most one row, and all S ⊆ Range(K),” 
Pr[K(D) ⊆  S] >= exp(ε) x Pr[K(D') ⊆  S] 
This formula can be interpreted as stating 
that the risk to one’s privacy should not 
substantially (as bounded by ε) increase as 
a result of participating in a statistical 
database. Namely, that an attacker should 
not be able to learn any information about 
any participant that they could not learn if 
the participant had opted out of the 
database. This goal is pursued by adding 
some noise to the result of a query on the 
dataset. There exist many different 
mathematic mechanisms to do that; the 
most commonly seen in this context is the 
Laplace mechanism, which adds noise 
derived from the Laplace distribution. It has 
only one parameter, defining the standard 
deviation, or noisiness.  This parameter 
should have some dependence on the 
privacy parameter, ε; it should also depend 
on the nature of the query itself, and more 
specifically, the risk to the most different 
individual of having their private information 
teased out of the data. 
Differential privacy comes in many different 
forms and variations which have not been 
covered in detail, but they all have several 
limitations, due in particular to the high 
computational complexity that the 
cryptographic techniques could introduce in 
a big dataset.  The main advantage of this 
approach is that its mathematical foundation 
makes it possible to actually measure the 
strength or the weakness of the results. The 
concept of differential privacy holds much 
potential, and is still the topic of active 
research. 
 
Table 1 - summary of general-purpose sanitization techniques 
SOURCE SUBJECT CONTRIBUTION 
Machanavajjhala et al.; 2006 k-anonimity Practical application 
Sweeney; 2002  General description 
Machanavajjhala; 2007 l-diversity General description of the techniques, and 
detailed explanation of the improvements 
over k-anonymity 
Li et  al.; 2007; 
Ciriani et al.; 2007; 
Machanavajjhala; 2007 t-closeness General description of the techniques, and 
detailed explanation of the improvements 
over k-anonymity 
Pingshui et al.; 2013;  
Roth; 2014  Differential 
Privacy 
General description and guidelines for the 
application of the procedure Neustar; 2014 
 
Sanitization in the Clearing Scenario 
To ascertain the suitability of the illustrated 
techniques to the clearing scenario, the first 
step is to define the correct evaluation 
criteria, which could depend from: 
1. The context of collection and usage 
of the data;  
2. The structure of the data; 
3. The objective of data processing. 
As an example, the work of Brickell and 
Shmatikov (2008) measures the trade-off 
between privacy (i.e., how much the 
adversary can still learn from the sanitized 
records) and utility (i.e., the residual 
accuracy of data-mining algorithms 
executed on the sanitized records with 
respect to what could be found for legitimate 
purposes from the original data set). Their 
paper showed that k-anonymity provides no 
privacy improvement on the tested dataset; 
furthermore, l-diversity is no better than 
trivial anonymization. Another interesting 
work Cormode et al. (2013) tries to quantify 
the effectiveness of sanitization in terms of 
privacy impact of a data release. To this end, 
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the study introduces the idea of 
incorporating a metric over 'privacy 
breaches' based on a notion of empirical 
privacy, and evaluating the corresponding 
empirical utility of the released data. The 
measure of a privacy breach is defined as 
the increase in correct a-posteriori 
inferences obtained by an adversary about 
sensitive values in the data, using a 
Bayesian classifier with previous knowledge. 
The cited paper applies this metric to the 
main four techniques, and concludes that 
differential privacy often provides the best 
empirical privacy for a baseline utility level, 
but that for increasing utility levels it can be 
preferable to adopt methods like t-closeness 
or l-diversity. There are other works that 
pursue the same kind of investigation, that 
mainly derive as a conclusion the weakness 
of k-anonymity and l-diversity algorithms. 
The main limitation of the reviewed literature 
is that only few papers interact with large 
amounts of data derived from public 
transport system. An exception is the paper 
by Ghasemzadeh, Fung, Chen, Awasthi 
(2013), which aims at preventing privacy 
attacks in a general sense, especially those 
damaging from a user's perspective. The 
proposed solution is an algorithm based on 
the LK-privacy model, using the approach of 
“identifying the LK-privacy requirement, and 
then eliminating the violating sequences by 
a sequences of suppressions with the goal 
of minimizing the impact on the structure of 
the user tracking.” What the authors claim is 
that their anonymization algorithm thwarts 
identity record linkages, while effectively 
preserving the information quality in terms 
of its suitability for the generation of a 
probabilistic flow-graph. It is a very 
interesting result, yet insufficient in the 
scenario of a clearing system, where the 
user's privacy perspective is not the only 
one that must be protected; in fact, the 
insider threat is not taken into account. 
Eventually, with the exception of differential 
privacy (which cannot be easily applied to 
huge amounts of data), it would seem that 
not a single sanitization solution is really 
effective. Actually, these studies 
demonstrate only how these techniques are 
not effective enough for the particular 
context taken into consideration. To 
properly evaluate their potential in our 
scenario, a more precise definition is 
needed for various characteristics, namely: 
1. the privacy requirements; 
2. the expected level of utility of 
datasets; 
3. how to measure the effectiveness of 
algorithms at preserving these 
properties. 
As regards privacy requirements and utility 
levels, it is possible to reason on the 
structure of sensitive values and quasi-
identifier in our case study, represented in 
Figure 2. The sensitive values are the user’s 
identity and location data; these values are 
the one to hide and protect. The means of 
transportation and the user’s contract data, 
otherwise, can be classified as quasi-
identifier values, since they could become 
sensitive if crossed with other information; 
at the same time, these are the data needed 
to calculate the clearing functions, so they 
cannot be depleted because of the precise 
information they carry. The goal of the 
anonymization process is to break the link 
between user identity and location, and to 
mask the QI values in a way that preserves 
the values needed for the clearing system. 
As regards the metric used to quantify 
privacy, there is very little literature. Atzori et 
al (2007) created a metric called δ-presence 
to evaluate the risk of identifying an 
individual in a table based on generalization 
of publicly known data. This work shows 
that existing anonymization techniques are 
inappropriate for situations where δ-
presence is a good metric (specifically, 
where knowing that an individual is in the 
database, as it very often happens to 
travellers of public transportation networks). 
So, despite its quality in general terms, this 
metric cannot be used in our context. 
Otherwise, the metric discussed in Ganta et 
al. (2008) is defined as the amount of 
“useful” data mining queries still existing 
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after the sanitization phase. As shown in the 
following section, an insider threat attack in 
our context is likely to take the form of a 
search pattern analysis; for this reason this 




Figure 2 - Sensitive data elements and their logical connections 
 
Table 2 - strengths and limitations of sanitization techniques applied to the public 
transport scenario 
 SOURCE  SUBJECT CONTRIBUTION 
Bishop et al.; 2010  k-anon., l-div., t-
closeness limits and 
vulnerabilities  
Outline the limits of the discussed 
techniques, and illustrate possible 
attacks (not tied to specific scenarios) 
Barbaro and Zeller; 2006 
Atzori et al; 2007 Metrics to evaluate the 
known anonymization 
techniques in terms of 
amount of privacy and 
data utility 
Introduces the delta-presence metric, 
which is useful to compare 
anonymization techniques in terms of 
effectiveness in hiding the presence of 
an individual in a dataset 
Ganta et al.; 2008 Introduces a metric to measure the 
utility of the dataset after anonymization, 
in terms of feasible queries 
Brickell and Shmatikov; 2008 Other works about the utility of the 
queries after anonymization using data 
mining techniques 
Cormode et al.; 2013 
 
Threats 
Known Attack Scenarios Against 
Anonymization 
As illustrated in Section 3, the residual 
presence of one or more sensitive elements 
in a dataset is structural, both because their 
complete obliteration would remove any 
utility from the dataset and because most 
sanitization techniques have intrinsic 
limitations. There are various motivations 
driving attackers to exploit any possible data 
source to un-conceal information, as 
described for example by Narayanan and 
Shmatikov (2008) and summarized by 
Bishop et al. (2010). Government agencies 
are more and more involved in extensive 
surveillance and are eager to collect any 
kind of information, even remotely 
connected with individuals. Marketing 
campaigns often exploit behavioural 
targeting of advertisements, for which the 
construction of networks and the 
highlighting of patterns is essential. 
Investigators, stalkers and employers may 
want to target specific individuals, possibly 
starting from a vantage point in terms of 
background and context information.  
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In our scenario, the clearing datasets could 
be exploited by any of these categories 
wishing to infer information regarding the 
operators’ business and/or the passengers 
of the public transportation system. 
Moreover, there is a specific insider threat: 
the participating companies may try to use 
data analysis to gain competitive 
advantages, both of the kind usually 
associated with market analysis (e.g. 
uncommonly profitable routes) and of the 
kind usually regarded as a trade secret (e.g. 
the optimization of the allocation of 
resources such as buses, trains, and 
personnel on board). 
The main issue is that when pursuing their 
goals, adversaries are not limited to the 
analysis of the clearing data alone. 
Conversely, they can reap great benefits 
through correlation with many existing 
public databases. The first widely known 
case of identification through correlation of 
different public datasets dates back to 2006, 
when AOL released anonymous data about 
search queries and New York Times 
reporters were able to find the real name 
linked to the pseudonym 4417749 (Barbaro 
and Zeller, 2006). As noted by Bishop et al. 
(2010) this case also shows a peculiar 
effect of the failure of the privacy protection: 
since the user acted as a proxy for friends 
with no Internet access, her name was 
associated to many queries unrelated to her 
condition and habits. The same could 
happen with public transportation data. As 
an example, if zones of boarding and 
alighting are kept wide enough to conceal 
the exact location of a passenger, they 
could end up enclosing points of interest 
(hospitals, schools, recreational facilities, 
shopping districts, etc.) which could lead an 
attacker to draw wrong conclusions, 
possibly even more damaging to the victim 
than the correct ones. 
While the AOL attack exploited various 
public records, a more recent episode 
targeted social networks (Narayanan and 
Shmatikov, 2008) exploiting correlated data 
from two networks attracting the same 
community of movie enthusiasts (the Netflix 
Prize and IMDB) to link user identities 
between the two datasets by correlation of 
their preferences. Social networks attract 
vast numbers of users, they collect every 
kind of personal information about them, 
and they can be conveniently searched by 
algorithms, thanks to the APIs provided to 
foster their growth by turning them into 
platforms for the development of social 
games and applications. Two recent studies 
regarding Twitter can be useful to 
understand the implication of leaving this 
kind of digital footprints. The WhACKY! 
application “harnesses the multi-source 
information from tweets to link Twitter 
profiles across other external services [. . .] 
to map Twitter profiles to their 
corresponding external service accounts 
using publicly available APIs.” (Correa et al., 
2012). Their study highlights how much 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII) can 
be programmatically gathered from social 
networks2, as reported in Table 3, and how 
the correlations can fill the gaps to draw a 
complete picture of an individual. (Calvino, 
2015 - in Italian - translates as “Stalking 
John Doe: surveillance, privacy and 
proximity in the age of Twitter”) 
demonstrated how the correlation between 
the Twitter activity of an Italian user and the 
publicly available census data allows to 
reduce the uncertainty about the real-world 
identity and location of the victim to a mere 
1-in-789 inhabitants of an area just 2500 
square meters wide. 
It is worth noting that Golle and Partridge 
(2009) already studied the correlation of 
commutes with publicly available census 
data back in 2009, spurring speculation 
about how the increased use of location-
capable devices would affect privacy 
(Narayanan, 2009). After four years, de 
Montjoye et al. (2013), working on location 
data from mobile telephone carriers, were 
able to claim that “four spatio-temporal 
points are enough to uniquely identify 95% 
                                                          
2 Many other sites yield less PII, yet can be used 
to link users with their location; just to give a few 
examples: Noisetube, FixMyStreet, 
OpenStreetMap, Panoramio 
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of the individuals” and that “even coarse 
datasets provide little anonymity”. A final 
example of the risks associated with 
location data is carried by the recent study 
of possible privacy breaches as a 
consequence of the traces left when renting 
bikes in London. This is a very relevant 
case for this paper, since the kind of data 
used in the studies described hereinafter is 
strikingly similar to what could be found in 
our datasets. Siddle (2014) analysed a 
publicly available Transport For London 
dataset that contained records of bike 
journeys for London’s bicycle hire scheme 
over a period of six months between 2012 
and 2013, reaching the conclusion that “with 
a little effort, it’s possible to find the actual 
people who have made the journeys”. The 
study appeared in the news (Merriman, 
2014), triggering TfL’s remedial action. In 
the words of TfL’s General Manager of 
Cycle Hire, Nick Aldworth “We’re committed 
to improving transparency across all our 
services and publish a range of data for 
customers and stakeholders online. Due to 
an administrative error, anonymized user 
identification numbers were shown against 
individual trips made between 22 July 2012 
and 2 February 2013. The data, which did 
not identify any individual customers online, 
was removed as soon as the matter was 
brought to our attention.” This episode 
highlights that, on top of the privacy 
concerns that must be taken into account 
when designing the clearing system, leaks 
are possible. 
 
Table 3 - PII accessible from social networks via APIs 
 Flicker Foursquare YouTube Last FM Twitter Facebook 
Username - - - - - - 
Name  V  V  V   V  V  V 
Gender -  V  V  V -  V 
Image  V  V  V  V  V  V 
Relationship - -  V - - - 
Location -  V  V  V  V - 
School - -  V - - - 
Company - -  V - - - 
Occupation - -  V - - - 
Hobbies - -  V - - - 
Music - -  V - - - 
Movies - -  V - - - 
Books - -  V  - - 
Contacts  V  V  V  V  V - 
Likes  V  V  V  V  V - 
Photos  V - - - - - 
Age - -  V  V - - 
Videos - -  V - - - 
Description - -  V -  V - 
Last access - -  V - - - 
Source: (Correa et al., 2012) 
 
Table 4 - analysis of correlation attacks on transport-related databases 
SOURCE SUBJECT CONTRIBUTION 




Actual demonstration of the general 
weakness illustrated in the previous section, 
and of even greater risks deriving from the 
availability of external data sources, 
impossible to control, which can be used to 
compute correlations through data mining or 
by filtering queries based on specific targets 
Bishop et al.; 2010 
Correa et al.; 2012 
Calvino; 2015 
Golle and Partridge; 2009 
deMontjoye et al.; 2013 
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Specific Attack Scenarios in Our 
Context and Countermeasures 
The kind of correlation with external 
databases exemplified in the previous 
section is feasible in our context too. Not 
only it is possible to leverage online social 
networks in the same way, but also to 
browse many free-access databases of 
sensitive data, strongly related to the 
regional context. Just to give two examples, 
it is very easy to extract from the 
corresponding web sites all the professional 
data information (such as office address, 
office telephone number etc.) of the regional 
health organization staff, as well as of the 
university staff in all the cities that have an 
academic institution. These data are not 
sensitive if taken alone; in fact, the 
transparency laws of the public 
administrations mandate their availability; as 
shown in the next section, it is their 
combination with the public transport 
dataset that could allow privacy breaches. 
If this were not enough, as explained 
previously the same sanitization algorithm 
are not free from attacks. In particular when 
there is the need to keep a good level of 
utility, algorithms as k-anonymity have been 
proven to be weak against attack where the 
adversary have a previous (“a-priori”) 
knowledge. The work of Machanavajjhala et 
al. (2006) and the l-diversity algorithm have 
been created to overcome these de-
anonymization issues of k-anonymity. As 
well explained in Ghasemzade et al (2013), 
anonymizing public transport data 
structured over a space with a high number 
of dimensions has been studied widely, but 
in general none of the proposed solutions 
takes into account the clearing scenario with 
its peculiar requisites about utility. In 
Ghasemzadeh et al. (2013) the differences 
between the different methods are clearly 
detailed.  
Ghinita et al. (2008) propose a permutation 
method that groups transactions with close 
proximity and then associates each group to 
a set of mixed sensitive values. Terrovitis et 
al. (2008) propose an algorithm to k-
anonymize transactions by generalization 
based on some given taxonomy trees. He 
and Naughton (2009) extend this method by 
introducing local generalization, which 
awards better quality.  Xu et al. (2008) 
extend the k-anonymity model by assuming 
that an adversary knows at most a certain 
number of transaction items of a target 
victim, which is similar to our assumption of 
limited background knowledge of an 
adversary. 
This is a very interesting model because it is 
definitely related to our scenario. It deals 
with attempts to gain a basic knowledge of 
some transaction rows, which is equivalent 
to get a certain number of possible travel 
records of a user: a valuable outcome for an 
attacker in our context. Yet, although their 
method addresses the high-dimensionality 
concern, it considers a transaction as a set 
of items rather than a sequence; this makes 
it useful to prevent attacks against the 
privacy of single users, but not to prevent 
attempts at general pattern discovery, which 
is typical of insider threat attacks. Therefore, 
it is not fully applicable to our problem, 
which needs to take into consideration the 
sequential ordering of travel data. 
Furthermore, Xu et al. (2008) achieve their 
privacy model by merely global suppression, 
which significantly decrease information 
quality on transport data.  
The last reviewed model was developed by 
Chen et al. (2011). It studies the releasing 
of transport dataset while satisfying 
differential privacy techniques. Although 
they claim that their approach maintains 
high quality and scalability in the context of 
set-valued data and is applicable to the 
relational data, their method is limited to 
preserving information for supporting count 
queries and frequent item-sets, as opposed 
to Xu et al. (2008), and not passenger 
tracking. The combination of these two 
pieces of research is a very promising 
research direction towards a complete 
solution for our scenario. 
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Table 5 - specialized approaches to sanitization that may fit well the clearing scenario 
SOURCE SUBJECT CONTRIBUTION 




Specifically tested on transport data, this approach 
redesigns known techniques to overcome of their 
limitations, dealing especially with the preservation of 
useful information. 
Ghinita, G. and Tao, Y. 




Introduces tools such as flow-graphs and transactional 
probabilities, which are very effective to analyze the 
loss of useful information. 
 
Case Studies 
This section presents some simple case 
studies built along the lines of the illustrated 
threats, showing how such concepts may 
easily be applied to the case under 
consideration. Two different threats are 
considered:  
1. an attacker who tracks the 
movement of a specific person (one 
of the authors) on the public 
transport network, exemplifying a 
threat to the privacy of individuals; 
2. an attacker who is interested in 
understanding what are the more 
profitable areas in terms of regional 
tickets sold, to challenge the 
business of an operator, 
exemplifying a threat to trade 
secrets of operators .  
A summary of the data items collected by 
operators for each ticket validation is 
described in Table 6. The definition of the 
minimal subset needed for clearing, and the 
anonymization of the selected fields, are the 
goal of the work in progress described in 
section 6. However, it is immediately 
possible to notice that the most sensitive 
attribute and the only direct identifier (in 
case of personal passes), i.e. the serial 
number of the ticket, cannot be omitted. 
Following its usage through the dataset 
(possibly over a period of time that cannot 
be known a priori) is the main function of the 
clearing system, which has to compute the 
share of revenue (generated when the ticket 
was bought) to distribute to each carrier 
which provided service to the ticket holder. 
In a broader sense, it is possible to define 
the required utility level of the dataset as 
being very similar to the goal of a potential 
attacker: that is, allowing to reconstruct a 
traveller’s itinerary. It is worth detailing how 
this reconstruction happens, to understand 
also how an attacker could try the same 
process and follow a traveller. 
 
Table 6 - Database table storing trip information 
Field name Content 
CONTRACT SUPPORT Type of physical token 
CONTRACT TYPE Type of contract (single trip, pass, etc.) 
VALIDATION TSP Timestamp of ticket usage 
VALIDATOR LOCATION Placement of the validating equipment 
CONTRACT RESELLER Company which sold the ticket 
VALIDATION LINE Bus/tram/train line number 
VALIDATION NR Number of parallel validations of the same ticket (e.g. many passengers 
on a single pay-as-you-go ticket) 
VALIDATOR SERIAL Serial number of validating equipment 
CONTRACT SN Serial number of the ticket 
VALIDATOR MODEL Model of the validating equipment 
VALIDATION ZONE Fare zone where the ticket was validated 
CONTRACT VALIDITY Geographical extension of the contract (regional, urban, etc.) 
CONTRACT ZONES Number of fare zones the contract allows to traverse 
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The itinerary is “blurred” within the dataset, 
because in the studied system passengers 
validate tickets only when boarding a 
bus/train, but not when leaving it. 
Consequently, raw data does not show a 
sequential structure; each row represents a 
leg of a trip for a contract, but there is no 
direct connection with the next legs of the 
same contract. Each leg can be represented 
by a structure like (A)T1  (B..Z),T2 
meaning that on time-stamp T1 a user 
(Contract_SN) goes from A in a known 
direction (inferred from Validation_Line) 
leading to a set of possible stops, one of 
which is reached at T2. This introduces 
uncertainty in the computation of the 
number of traversed zones, which is needed 
by the clearing system when a vehicle of a 
different operator is used to continue the trip: 
in this case, the end of the first leg must be 
inferred from the validation that happens at 
the start of the second one.  
To this end a probabilistic flow-graph can be 
exploited. According to Ghasemzadeh et al. 
(2013) a probabilistic flow-graph is a tree 
where each node represents a point in 
space-time, the edges corresponds to 
transitions between two places, leaving the 
origin at a given time to reach the 
destination at a different time, and each 
transition has an associated probability of 
being actually followed. For every node, 
there may also be a non-zero termination 
probability, which is the percentage of 
passengers who exit the transportation 
system at the node. By looking for 
validations of the same contract that are 
consecutive within a given time-frame, a 
possible itinerary can be identified.  For 
example, if a validation (A)T1 could take a 
passenger to (B..Z), and there is a 
validation (D)T2, with the value of (T2-T1) 
falling within a given threshold, a non-zero 
probability can be associated to the edge 
(A)T1(D)T2. The analysis can proceed 
seeking for destinations that can be reached 
from (D). 
Table 7 and Figure 3 depict an example of 
the probabilistic flow-graph derived from 
one of our datasets for a few contracts. With 
enough samples, probabilities can be 
estimated with acceptable precision, and 
the graph becomes a faithful enough 
representation of the distribution of 
passenger over the network. At the same 
time, each set of itineraries for a given 
contract represents the habits of a 
passenger, enabling correlations with other 
data sources (places around the nodes, 
events close to the timestamps), and 
potentially leading to the association 
between the contract and a personal identity.  
 
Table 7 - Table travel data in the sequential version 
Serial Sequential travel positions 
70001112 (1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2->(3,248)T3->(1,245)T4 
50004058 (1, 245)T3->(1, 245)T4-(1, 245)T6 
50004077 (2,249)T2->(1, 245)T5 
50004070 (4,260)T1->(2,249)T2->(1, 245)T5 
70001386 (1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2 
70001389 (1, 245)T3->(2,249)T4 
75001498 (1, 245)T1->(2,249)T2->(1, 245)T4 
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Figure 3 - Travel data represented as a probabilistic flow-graph 
 
Stalking Franco Callegati 
As a proof of concept, let us present the 
case of an attacker who wants to target one 
of the authors, to track his movement on the 
public transport network. Franco Callegati is 
a professor at the University of Bologna. He 
has a public web page detailing the address 
of his office which is located in the off-site 
campus of Cesena, about 60 Km East of 
Bologna, and showing that he works at the 
Department of Electrical, Electronic and 
Information Engineering, which has its 
central offices in Bologna. The phone 
directory lists his home address in Imola, a 
smaller town about 30 Km east of Bologna. 
Clearly from this basic data it can be 
inferred that Callegati will mostly travel to 
work from Imola to Cesena where he 
teaches and tutor students, but he will likely 
travel to Bologna too, for those sort of 
activities requiring physical presence related 
to the Department or to the University’s 
central offices. Sometimes he will also travel 
from Cesena to Bologna (or the other way) 
when he has some commitment in both 
sites in the same day. 
With this background, an attacker who has 
got a copy of the clearing dataset can 
associate the victim’s identity with the serial 
number of his MiMuovo pass. Callegati is 
admittedly a very easy target, yet he serves 
us well for the purpose of giving a concrete 
and real example of usage of clearing 
datasets. Given the almost non-existent 
effort that allows a potential attacker to 
reach his goal, there is little doubt that 
“harder” targets can be exploited with some 
more, but still reasonable effort; as already 
illustrated at the end of section 4, even a 
coarse localization of commuting start and 
end points, when correlated with some 
background information about the victim, 
can yield significant results. 
The dataset shows about 2,000 passengers 
boarding trains that leave Imola in the 
morning (all figures are computed as 
averages on working days). Since the 
validation occurs only at the start of the trip, 
their destination is not explicit, but of course 
it can be inferred with a good approximation 
by coupling the onward trip of a given ticket 
with the return trip. This further analysis 
yields slightly more than 1,000 passengers 
getting back from Bologna in the afternoon 
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(Fig. 4, pink arrow) and slightly less than 
200 passengers getting back from Cesena 
(Fig. 4, grey arrow). The number of 
candidates drops dramatically when only 
passengers who travel alternatively to both 
Bologna and Cesena in different days of the 
week are considered. Only 14 MiMuovo 
users show a commuting pattern of this kind 
(Fig. 4, red arrow). 
 
 
Figure 4 - Commuting flows from Imola to Bologna and Cesena 
Note: Background cartography: http://www.openstreetmap.org/copyright - OpenStreetMap 
contribs 
 
The possible inferences do not stop here. It 
is easy to check that the Callegati’s office in 
Cesena is near enough to the train station 
(15 minutes on foot), and that it is not 
conveniently served by public transport 
(direct bus only once an hour)3. An attacker 
could make an educated guess that 
Callegati will not take a bus when he leaves 
Cesena’s train station, and thus eliminate 
candidates who do it. Conversely, the site of 
Callegati’s department in Bologna is twice 
as far from Bologna’s train station, 
compared to the Cesena situation, and 
much better connected to it by bus (6 to 8 
connections per hour). In this case an 
educated guess would lead an attacker to 
consider the exclusion of candidates who do 
not board a bus in Bologna after reaching 
                                                          
3 The whole public transport network of the 
Emilia-Romagna Region is on Google Transit 
the train station. Note also that the clearing 
function can be computed without taking 
into account the line number, but in case the 
full database is leaked, or in case the line 
number is kept on record for secondary 
uses, it would be possible to further restrict 
the set of candidates to those boarding one 
of the two bus lines connecting the train 
station with the department, out of the 19 
serving the train station. 
In our tests, this is enough to pinpoint the 
victim. This result was reached without even 
taking into account another very valuable 
source of information, the timetable of the 
lectures in Cesena, which would allow 
establishing a precise spatio-temporal 
constraint to the victim’s movements 
towards one of his usual destinations. In 
conclusion, by following these patterns, an 
attacker can identify Callegati’s MiMuovo 
card ID and then follow his movements also 
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outside his most common habits by 
accessing the clearing database.  
Unfair Competition 
Ticket validation datasets contain potentially 
useful information for an operator wishing to 
uncover the business practices of its 
competitors or challenge their business 
practice. This kind of attack comes from the 
inside, and it is very difficult to deal with. 
Access control rules cannot be very strict 
against insiders, who enjoy not only the 
possibility of easier read-only access to 
datasets, but also the opportunity to inject 
carefully crafted data to stimulate the 
production of particularly useful outputs, like 
a cryptanalyst that is able to perform a 
chosen plaintext attack. 
One of the most valuable pieces of 
information would be the planning strategy 
in the usage of vehicles, which is a crucial 
issue for a transport provider and that can 
be inferred at some extent by exploiting the 
information in VALIDATION ZONE, 
VALIDATOR LOCATION, and VALIDATION 
LINE.  
Here a simple and realistic inference is 
shown, built by looking at the correlation 
between the type of ticket and the zone of 
its usage. It is a piece of information that 
can give a very small margin of profit by 
pushing sales of multi-trip tickets where they 
are most appreciated, making profits on the 
rate of unclaimed trips for lost tickets (what 
is not claimed for clearing remains in the 
pockets of the seller). This should clearly be 
a small percentage of the whole ticket 
volume. Nonetheless in today’s competitive 
markets every source of income may be 
vital; moreover the examples show that this 
sort of analysis may pave the road to similar 
analyses in “business areas” which are not 
considered today, because they are 
impossible to accurately explore in absence 
of large datasets.  
Over 30 data mining tests over the ticket 
validation datasets were performed (Melis, 
2014) using the Weka software (Hall et al., 
2009). The correlation of interest was best 
highlighted by means of cluster analysis, i.e. 
a set of exploratory techniques that aim to 
group the unity of a population in statistics 
on the basis of their similarity in terms of 
values taken by the observed variables. As 
an example, Figure 5 shows the result of 
cluster analysis according to the Simple K-
means 4  classifier. It is clear that the 
attributes of the sold tickets form well-
separated clusters, whose significance can 
be useful from a business perspective. 
Once this hypothesis is verified, a 
Bayesian 5  classifier allows to infer more 
details over some attributes. The structure 
of the clearing system allows an attacker to 
feed the Bayesian classifier a large amount 
of past knowledge from the snapshots. The 
result is that the algorithm is able to 
correctly predict the belonging to a given 
cluster of over 90% of new instances. 
This result needs to be interpreted in a 
specific context in order to show the power 
of this kind of attacks. The Bayesian test 
shows that theoretically, by knowing only 
the contract type and the validation zone, it 
is possible to infer the correct serial number 
of the contract support, which would reveal 
the pseudo-identity of the contract holder. 
Beneath the privacy risks for the contract 
holder, this discovery would allow a 
company to determine the history of a 
pseudo-identity. This history would be 
revealing the type of contract, along with its 
movements, leading to a kind of profiling 
and possible definition of targeted offers 
that is usually regarded as unfair 
competition in our context. 
A more general attack is also possible, 
again by using the results from cluster tests. 
Cluster analysis usually aims to group the 
elements of a population on the basis of 
their similarity, in terms of values found in 
the observed variables. However, if the 
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focus is put on a particular attribute, for 
example the contract type, it becomes 
possible to trace the trend in terms of other 
variables, for example (see again Figure 5) 
how the contract is used in a group of 
specific zones. This could easily lead an 
operator to discover the contract distribution 
of a competitor. So by intercepting this 
market trend, once again, the opportunity 




Figure 5 - Results of a clustering analysis of the dataset with Weka 
 
Privacy by Design 
Having assessed the high potential risks 
associated with data sharing, it is necessary 
to investigate what is the best approach to 
build security into the clearing system from 
the early design phase, in which the authors 
are involved. 
Definition 
Privacy by Design (PbD) is the principle by 
which data protection and information 
privacy is built into information systems from 
the design stage. The idea builds on 
existing notions of value-sensitive design, 
code as law, and Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs) (Koops and Leenes, 
2014). Considerations about how to protect 
people’s data and personal information 
must enter the system development life-
cycle from an early stage where 
architectural decisions to protect privacy 
can still be made (Cavoukian, 2009; Schaar, 
2010; Spiekermann, 2012). Such early-
stage design decisions are likely to be more 
effective for the protection of privacy in a 
new information system, as there are many 
more options available to designers than to 
the engineer who needs to patch the system 
following a privacy incident (Brown, 2013; 
Schaar, 2010). 
Privacy is designed into an information 
system when data protection and 
information privacy principles are 
incorporated into the overall design of the 
system (Schaar, 2010), thereby ensuring 
that privacy becomes integral to the 
organisational priorities, project objectives, 
design processes and planning operations 
(Cavoukian, 2009). A design that protects 
data subjects’ privacy and maximises data 
utility requires a multi-dimensional and 
sophisticated consideration of the risks, and 
how all the parts of the design operate 
together (Zevenbergen et al., 2013). Privacy 
by Design in European Law Recital 46 of 
Directive 95/46 of the European Union 
contains the requirement that “requires that 
appropriate technical and organizational 
measures be taken, both at the time of the 
design of the processing system and at the 
time of the processing itself, particularly in 
18
Pacific Asia Journal of the Association for Information Systems, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 4
https://aisel.aisnet.org/pajais/vol7/iss4/4
DOI: 10.17705/1pais.07403
Privacy-Preserving Design of Data Processing Systems / Callegati et al. 
Pacific Asia Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 7 No. 4, pp.25-50 / December 2015 43 
order to maintain security”. Article 17 of the 
directive adds the requirement that “the 
controller must implement appropriate 
technical and organizational measures to 
protect personal data against accidental or 
unlawful destruction or accidental loss, 
alteration, unauthorized disclosure or 
access [...]”. 
Privacy by design goes further than mere 
information security, as recognised by the 
data protection by design and by default 
requirement in the proposed General Data 
Protection Regulation 2012/0011/COD. 
Article 23 of the proposed Regulation 
contains the requirement that controllers 
implement measures to ensure “only those 
personal data are processed which are 
necessary for each specific purpose of the 
processing and are especially not collected 
or retained beyond the minimum necessary 
for those purposes, both in terms of the 
amount of the data and the time of their 
storage.” Although this requirement is a step 
in the direction of PbD, the proposed 
methodologies in literature go further than 
the European legislator has proposed. 
Methodology 
A synthesis from the literature shows the 
following factors are essential to an effective 
Privacy by Design strategy. This list does 
not go into detail about specific de-
identification techniques, software patterns 
or other privacy enhancing technologies. 
Rather, it is a list of more abstract factors 
that contribute to a successful Privacy by 
Design approach: 
Define privacy risk assessment, goals & 
strategy - An information system design 
should start with an assessment of the risks 
of the data that will be collected (see for 
example Rotter (2008). The project 
instigator should define clearly the goals he 
or she wants to achieve in terms of privacy 
protection, while consideration of how to 
reach these will follow in further steps 
(Spiekermann, 2012). 
Holistic approach - The risk assessment 
and goals will inform the privacy design 
strategy, which is comprised of an iterative 
approach of the steps below (Hoepman, 
2012). It is vital the information system is 
considered as a whole in a holistic approach. 
An effective privacy by design strategy will 
have privacy settings set by default, since 
software settings are unlikely to be changed 
by users (Cavoukian, 2009; Gross and 
Acquisti, 2005; Mackay, 1991). 
Data minimisation & Purpose limitation - 
Information systems should be designed in 
a way that they use the minimal necessary 
personal data, without necessarily 
compromising on the functionality of the 
system. Therefore, the purpose of the 
system must be clearly defined and the 
combinations of collectable personal data 
analysed that are necessary for the full 
functionality (Brown, 2013; Hourcade et al., 
2014; Schaar, 2010) . This makes data 
minimisation a necessary and foundational 
element of Privacy by Design (Gurses et al., 
2007). 
De-identification and Aggregation - When 
the necessary personal data have been 
identified, the project instigator should 
analyse to what extent the information 
system can be operated without the 
identifier fields of the data subjects in her 
database. The database should be de-
identified or aggregated to the furthest 
extent possible. Although useful to increase 
the privacy of data subjects, de-
identification and aggregation are never fully 
robust against re-identification practices and 
should not be considered as a means to 
circumvent the application of data protection 
law to the project (Danezis and Troncoso, 
2013; de Montjoye et al., 2013; Ohm, 2009; 
Sharad and Danezis, 2013). 
Secondary uses & Dissemination type - 
Before deciding how best to de-identify any 
collected data, the researcher must decide 
how the research data will be disseminated 
and which further uses the data will be 
suitable for. For example, it may be required 
that the data be shared in an open data 
format, whereby the risk of privacy harms 
will be significant, thus requiring the 
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adoption of a strong de-identification 
method. The project instigator can choose 
to share the data only upon request, and 
decide the method of dissemination on a 
case by case basis, along with suitable legal 
agreements, which should also be enforced 
if breached (Zevenbergen et al., 2013). 
Transparency/openness - The OECD 
established that data controllers must be 
transparent about the information processes 
where personal data is processed (OECD, 
1980). This is achieved by informing the 
potential data subject about the information 
processing before gathering informed 
consent in a lawful manner, while also 
complying with the data subject’s rights 
such as maintaining the accuracy of the 
data and allowing access to correct the data 
(Brown, 2013; Schaar, 2010; Spiekermann, 
2012). 
Accountability - Privacy by Design is not 
merely a technical process, but must be 
complemented by information security, 
functionality, operational efficiency, 
organizational control and business 
processes that enable a trustworthy 
information environment (Koops and 
Leenes, 2014). A careful Security by Design 
plan must also be set up, whereby topics 
such as encryption and access limitations 
are ensured (Brown, 2013; Spiekermann, 
2012). A plan must be established for when 
unforeseen risks materialise, and legal 
agreements on information sharing must be 
enforced effectively. 
Application 
In order to take the described factors into 
account when designing the clearing system, 
we propose to undertake an iterative 
approach described by the following steps: 
1. Data minimization - take into 
account the needs of the legitimate 
analysers to define the smallest set 
of attributes that allow performing 
the intended computations; 
2. Sanitization techniques - choose 
the perturbation and generalization 
algorithms that provide the most 
effective concealment of sensitive 
data without jeopardizing its utility 
for legitimate uses; 
3. Verification - evaluate the results to 
formally verify that the privacy 
policies are respected and that the 
resulting dataset actually preserves 
its intended utility. If some basic 
constraint is found violated, or 
margins for further improvement are 
visible, the cycle is reiterated to 
achieve the foreseen refinement, 
otherwise the process stops. Note 
that this step could highlight an 
intrinsic contradiction between some 
of the privacy policies and some of 
the analysis requirements, leading 
either to the decision to relax some 
requirement or to the conclusion 
that the desired scenario is 
unachievable. 
The last step of the iterative process calls 
for a formal metric to evaluate correctness 
and effectiveness. The literature already 
provides useful methodologies for this 
purpose. 
Ganta and Acharya (2008) studied the 
general problem of fusion resilient 
anonymization. They stated the problem as 
a search for the optimal value of an 
objective which is the weighted sum of 
protection and utility. Protection is 
measured in terms of how hard is for an 
adversary to gain information by correlating 
the anonymized dataset with external 
sources. More formally, if P is the original 
sensitive dataset, and P I  is the sanitized 
release of P , an adversary can exploit 
information fusion techniques to derive a 
de-sanitized version Pˆ from P I. The 
effectiveness of the applied sanitization 
process is measured as the dissimilarity 
between Pˆ and P . 
Brickell and Shmatikov (2008) performed a 
similar analysis, again studying the trade-off 
between utility and protection, but on a 
more formal level. Their claim was quite 
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thought-provoking: sophisticated 
anonymization techniques offer no real 
advantages over trivial ones, i.e. datasets 
sanitized with complex application of 
generalization and perturbation algorithms, 
depending on the algorithm parameters, 
either provide no additional utility vs. 
trivially-sanitized datasets, or leak much 
more information to adversaries than what 
is gained in terms of legitimate analysis. 
Besides posing interesting questions that 
researchers in this field could find useful to 
orientate their efforts, their paper also 
provides formal definitions for various 
metrics related to privacy of data tables and 
utility of sanitized databases. In particular, 
they study privacy both under a syntactic 
perspective (pure statistical correlation) and 
under a semantic perspective, measuring 
the gain in adversarial knowledge afforded 
by the sanitized table. 
Bishop et al. (2010) explore the topic by 
focusing on relationships that can be used 
to desanitize sensitive data. They model the 
problem of data sanitization as a double set 
of assertions, made of the constraints 
defining the privacy properties that must 
hold against adversarial attacks, and of the 
targets defining the information that the 
legitimate analysts want to extract from the 
sanitized dataset. They highlight the 
importance of defining a precise threat 
model as a requisite for drawing complete 
and concrete privacy policies, and a precise 
analysis policy that, in opposition to the 
privacy policy, puts limits to the sanitization 
process to avoid excessive loss of utility. 
They exploit ontologies to automate 
reasoning over these opposing requisites 
and solve the constraint satisfaction 
problem they represent. A question they 
leave open is: what is the most appropriate 
language to express these requirements? 
To define our specific privacy by design 
process, we plan to investigate and possibly 
apply the common concepts and techniques 
presented in all of these works, in addition 
to a specific and noteworthy suggestion that 
comes from the last one. In the words of the 
authors: “Perhaps the most constructive 
approach is to provide two sets of 
relationships. The first lists those 
relationships that are known to hold in the 
raw data, and must not hold if desanitization 
is to be prevented. The second is a set of 
relationships that, if they held, would enable 
desanitization. The sanitizer can deal with 
the first set as appropriate. The second 
enables the sanitizer to perform a simple 
risk analysis, centred on two questions: (1) 
What is the probability that the relationships 
in this set hold; (2) What is the probability 
that the adversary will be able to determine 
that the relationships hold, and use that to 
desanitize the data?”. This approach seems 
to be especially useful because it allows 
both designing sanitization by evaluating the 
effectiveness of the planned techniques, 
and to measure and understand the risks 
deriving from future evolutions of the 
intended use of the datasets. 
 
Conclusions 
This manuscript highlights the privacy 
threats that can emerge from sharing or 
publishing the data related to usage of 
public mobility tickets. In the context of an 
integrated mobility system run by a set of 
operators, sharing data about tickets usage 
become mandatory for revenue clearing 
purposes. Unfortunately this may also pave 
the road to privacy attacks to individuals or 
institutions, such as, but not limited to those 
exemplified in this paper. 
An ample discussion is presented of how 
the sanitization approaches could work in 
this scenario, and what their limitations are; 
it lays the ground for future research aimed 
both at improving the effectiveness of 
sanitization techniques in the specific 
scenario, and to derive generally-applicable 
principles. 
As an alternative solution, the applicability 
of the “privacy by design” approach is 
examined. In the context of the design of 
the data sharing system for clearing 
purposes, its aim is to minimize the 
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likelihood of the emergence of privacy 
threats. The general-purpose definition of 
the approach is integrated with an 
implementation plan that takes into account 
a variety of literature sources to verify the 
effectiveness of the applied methodology, in 
order to iteratively converge towards the 
solution that strikes the most appropriate 
balance between data utility and privacy, 
possibly quantifying the effects of a breach. 
The first set of research questions, 
regarding the suitability of existing 
techniques to protect privacy in the public 
transport scenario, has thus being 
answered in a substantially negative way. 
The second wave of research questions, on 
the possible definition of a more effective 
framework to devise privacy-enhanced data 
management processes, has been partially 
addressed. The present study meets its 
main limitations here: the negative findings 
from the review phase, and the realization 
that similar initiatives actually deal with less 
demanding requisites, were useful in 
highlighting the deficiencies of current 
approaches and lead to devise suggestions 
on how the framework could be structured, 
yet its concrete development will be the 
subject of future work. 
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